CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY

August 21, 1982

China is aware of its responsibilities as a permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations. Everyone can trust China in two respects. First, China adheres to principles. Second, China means what it says. We do not play political games, nor do we engage in the play of words. I personally love to play bridge, but China does not like to play political cards. This is not only the case today, but was also the case during the period since the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949 when Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai were leading the country. This is why so many friends around the world trust us. We understand the circumstances in many countries, particularly Third World countries. China’s foreign policy is consistent and can be summed up in three sentences. First, we oppose hegemonism. Second, we safeguard world peace. Third, we are eager to strengthen unity and cooperation, or what might be termed ‘union and cooperation’, with other Third World countries. The reason I lay special emphasis on the Third World is that opposition to hegemonism and safeguarding world peace are of special significance to the Third World. Who are the victims of hegemonism? Is it the United States or the Soviet Union? No, it is the United States and the Soviet Union that practise hegemonism, so they are not the victims. Neither are developed countries such as Japan, Canada, and countries in Europe and Oceania the victims. Eastern Europe suffers a little. If world peace is disrupted, who will be the first to become victims? Actually, there has been no peace since the end of World War II. Although no major wars have been fought, minor ones have continued. Where are the minor wars fought? In the Third World! It is the superpowers that practise hegemonism and sow discord. They are the ones with their hands in that arena! For many years, the superpowers have cashed in on conflicts between Third World countries in order to achieve their objectives. Although the Third World itself faces various problems, it is the Third World countries and their peoples that become the real victims. For this reason it must be the Third World that is the genuine and primary force for safeguarding world peace and opposing hegemonism, because this concern immediately affects Third World countries. This follows necessarily because of the position and immediate interests of the Third World itself.

We are by no means pessimists. We simply want to point out that the danger of war exists. We have said that while the factors bringing about war have increased, the factors for preventing war are also growing. With reference to the United Nations, we can see that after World War II, a positive factor in international politics has been the rise of the Third World. The Third World member countries in the United Nations have increased. The importance of this change must be recognized. Hegemony may continue to run rampant. However, the days are gone when hegemonists wilfully decided the destiny of people all over the world. Although the Third World is poor, its international political influence has increased considerably. This cannot be overlooked. Of course, coordination between Third World countries is far from ideal. The matter is very complicated; so much work remains to be done in this regard. As for China, our strength is limited, as is our role. Many people contend that China holds a special position in the Third World. We say that China is just another member of the Third World, and as such, should discharge its own responsibilities. Many friends claim that China is the leader of the Third World. However, we say that China cannot be the leader, because acting as the leader will breed adversity. Those who practise hegemonism are discredited, so serving as the leader of the Third World would earn us a bad reputation. These are not words of modesty. I say this out of genuine political consideration.

We have always believed that disarmament talks would be of no avail, but we are in favour of attempting negotiations. Some people have alleged that China is bellicose, but in fact China hopes for peace more than anything else. China hopes that there will be no war for the rest of the century. We need to develop the country and shake off backwardness. The primary task we have set as the initial goal for the realization of modernization is to create comparative prosperity by the end of this century. If we can accomplish this goal, we will be in a much better position. More importantly, we shall achieve a new starting point. Within the ensuing 30 to 50 years, we shall approach the level of developed countries. We do not mean to catch up with, still less do we say to surpass, but only to approach the level of developed countries. Therefore, we cherish the hope for a peaceful international environment. Should war break out, our plan would be thwarted, and in that case we could not but postpone the plan. During the period up to the end of the century and extending decades into the future, we hope that there will be peace. Our proposals for safeguarding world peace are by no means empty talk, but instead are based on our own needs. Of course, this also meets the needs of people all over the world, particularly the needs of people in the Third World. Therefore, opposing hegemonism and safeguarding world peace are our established policies and are the foundation of our foreign policy. Some people around the world wonder whether China’s policy will change once the country’s current leaders are gone. I have just answered the question. Our policy should not be altered; China must continue to pursue this policy if it hopes to develop, and no one should willfully change the policy. However, China alone cannot guarantee that it will be successful in carrying out this policy. Should some nation impose war on us, we are not afraid and our plans will simply be postponed for a number of years. But we shall resume economic construction after the war ends. At present, our domestic situation is fairly good. The Chinese people are wholeheartedly concentrating on economic development. Our foreign policy coincides with this magnificent goal. Although this objective may seem modest to some people, we hail it as a magnificent achievement.

(Excerpt from a talk with Javier Perez de Cuellar, Secretary-General of the United Nations. )

ADVISORY COMMISSIONS WILL BE A

TRANSITIONAL MEASURE FOR THE ABOLITION

OF LIFE TENURE IN LEADING POSTS

July 30, 1982

I did not intend to speak at this meeting. We are preparing two documents for submission to the Seventh Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee. Much effort has gone into the drafting and, in my opinion, both documents are fairly well thought out. Of course, some parts need further deliberation. As Comrade Hu Qiaomu has just said, it is impossible to meet the requirement in Article 18 of the draft revised Party Constitution that the main documents of a Party congress be distributed for discussion by the whole Party one month in advance. Some other requirements are difficult to meet too, such as the stipulation that delegates to a Party congress should be notified of its convening three months in advance. In short, we shouldn’t commit ourselves on paper to do what cannot be done. A Party Constitution doesn’t have to go into so much detail anyway. Generally speaking, the two documents are fairly well prepared.

There are some problems that have not been fully solved in the present draft of the revised Constitution. For instance, it mentions the problem of life tenure in leading posts without providing a definitive solution. The same is true with setting up a retirement system. Establishing advisory commissions may serve as a transitional measure. In view of the present situation in the Party — which is that the average age of our cadres is too high but that old comrades are still the mainstay — we must not deal with this issue too hastily; hasty measures won’t work. Another thing is that over the years we haven’t promoted enough young and middle-aged cadres to leading posts. We simply haven’t paid enough attention to this matter. But we should also admit that there really are obstacles, a number of which, though not all, are created wittingly. Thus we need advisory commissions to facilitate the transition from the system of life tenure in leading posts to a retirement system. We adopt this measure to make the transition comparatively smooth. The commissions will probably be abolished three Party congresses from now. If they were to be abolished after two Party congresses — that is, in 10 years’ time — how many of us here today would still be around? Those who are now 60 will be 70 then, those now 70 will be 80, and those now 80 will be 90. That is why we say the advisory commissions are a transitional measure — and a necessary one. We have chosen this unprecedented form as a result of our Party’s actual situation. But even during this transitional stage we must endeavour to reduce the average age of cadres and to create conditions for abolishing life tenure and setting up a retirement system. There are many young and middle-aged cadres. The trouble is that for a long time our veteran comrades have paid no attention to them when selecting successors. They have always drawn from within the circle of their own acquaintances. Thus the problem was never solved. It is especially serious in the army, and it’s harder to solve there than in civilian units, where the situation is now somewhat better. This has a bearing on army building. The State Council and the organs directly under the Central Committee have done quite well in the current organizational readjustment, but the army has lagged behind. If we really want to choose the right cadres, they can be found. Of course, the problem of transition is present to some degree under all circumstances, and we will have to work out whatever measures are necessary. But if this generation of ours can’t solve the issue, it will count against us. A group has recently been set up to study the question of recruiting more young and middle-aged cadres into the next Central Committee. After some discussion this group has proposed an average age roughly the same as that at the inception of the Eleventh Central Committee. We were young when we first became members of the Central Committee. Comrade Chen Yun and I were both 52 at the time of the Eighth National Congress, which elected a Central Committee with a fairly low average age. As it is now, the average age of the Central Committee members is higher than that of those elected at the Ninth, the Tenth, and the Eleventh National Congresses. Of course, those who rose to prominence through “rebellion” and became Central Committee members during the “cultural revolution” were young. But that was abnormal. The transitional form we have now chosen is appropriate. However, during the transition period — which may last, say, 10 years (the combined tenure of two Central Committees) — we must make a real effort to lower the average age of members of the Central Committee.

(Excerpt from a speech at an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.)

SPEECH AT A FORUM OF THE MILITARY

COMMISSION OF THE CENTRAL

COMMITTEE OF THE CPC

July 4, 1982

This forum has held useful discussions on problems in the army. I agree with the way these problems have been handled, though the results haven’t been fully satisfactory in all cases. At the moment, we can’t expect too much.

Comrade Yang Shangkun has already talked about structural reform, so I’m not going to say much about that. I just want to make one point: the importance of that reform. Recently, I have spoken twice about the four guarantees of our adherence to the socialist system and of our success in the modernization drive. The first guarantee is to undertake structural reform, including the organizational streamlining we are now carrying out. The second is to build a socialist civilization with a high cultural and ideological level, so as to inculcate ideals, morality, knowledge and discipline in all our people. Of course, there are also “the five things to stress and the four things to beautify”, and in the army the “four haves, three stresses and two defy’s”. All these calls are in the same spirit, and they are all correct. The army, of course, has its own characteristics. I have talked to some of our theorists about why we need to emphasize discipline. They agreed that it is essential. We simply must have discipline. Without it, we would find it impossible to work together with one heart and one mind for the realization of our goals. The Chinese revolution has always depended on discipline, especially voluntary observance of it. This has been the best tradition of the Chinese Communist Party since its founding. The third guarantee is a firm crackdown on economic crime. The fourth is Party building, the consolidation of the Party’s organization and the rectification of its work style. These are what we mean by the four guarantees. Until the four modernizations are completed we will need these four guarantees at every step. For instance, why must we crack down on economic crime? Well, to carry out socialist modernization, we must adopt the policy of opening to the outside world and stimulating the economy. As we open to the outside world, corrupt capitalist things from abroad will find their way into China. And it is quite a problem to decide how far we should go in stimulating the economy. We are determined to open up and to stimulate the economy. But in order to ensure that this policy really benefits our modernization and does not take us off the socialist path, we must at the same time fight economic crime. Otherwise things will get out of hand. Already quite a few problems have arisen. Economic crimes are very serious and many cases are difficult to handle. Serious crimes and major criminals are to be found not only in the economic but in the political and cultural fields as well. In sum, we cannot attain the four guarantees all at once; We must keep working for them for a long time. We won’t launch any mass movements, but we must continue our efforts in this regard throughout the course of the four modernizations. We must not forget the four guarantees for a single day. We must make their realization part of our daily work and struggle. Not all the problems related to the four guarantees are in the nature of class struggle, but there is class struggle in some cases.

As for organizational streamlining, we have taken the first step. The Party and the government got started a little earlier than the army. On the whole we are going ahead smoothly. In the course of this forum you have come to a unified view. Now that you are all in agreement, it will be easier to get things done in the army. It now appears possible that the army, which is known for quick action, will complete the first stage in a somewhat shorter time than our other institutions. At present, all the streamlining that is being done in the Party, the government and the army is only a first step. Structural reform requires the elaboration of complete rules, regulations, work methods and methods of leadership. It is impossible to accomplish all these things at once. There are many rules and regulations to be instituted. For instance, in establishing the responsibility system, we must define various duties and assign them to departments and persons. Everything must be clear. Now that so many ministries and commissions under the State Council have been amalgamated, our old methods will no longer work. The number of Vice-Premiers has been reduced to two. This means that, as the streamlining proceeds, we must strengthen the ministries and commissions, increase their responsibilities and enhance their ability to handle problems. They in their turn should do likewise with regard to their subordinate departments and bureaus. By the same token, heavier responsibility should devolve on factories, mines and some corporations. We just can’t afford not to streamline.

The army faces this problem too. The Military Commission and the various general departments should be streamlined. It’s not yet completely clear how that should be done. But the present structure, method of leadership and organization of work in the army are not very satisfactory; they are too complicated. We have the Military Commission, its Standing Committee, its regular working conferences and then the several general departments. The fact is, we should increase the responsibilities of the General Staff Headquarters, the General Political Department and the General Logistics Department, and have only a small co-ordinating organization above them. With too many leaders, not only do the comrades at lower levels find it hard to get things done, but we ourselves have trouble circulating papers for approval. When we fought in the past, a field army had only a few leaders, as did an army group, an army-level unit or a division. In some divisions the commander was also the political commissar. He was assisted by one or two deputy political commissars, and they all co-operated very well. Peng Dehuai was both commander and political commissar of the First Field Army, as was Chen Yi of the Third. Each of the other field armies had two leaders. That arrangement was very efficient. Today, however, there are too many leaders in each high-level group. We are taking only the first step in organizational streamlining. We must keep at it. We’ll do things one at a time as conditions become ripe. When conditions are not ripe, it is better to go a little slower. In the current streamlining, the army is moving rather slowly, but that’s necessary. The more thorough the preparations and the more unanimous the thinking of the people concerned, the more easily problems will be solved.

Comrade Yang Shangkun has discussed four points relating to structural reform in the army. Today I’ll concentrate on two. First, we must raise efficiency. This means increasing combat effectiveness and efficiency in general. Second, structural reform will make it possible for us to select more capable people for promotion — this is one of its important features. With the bloated organization we’ve had, it has been virtually impossible to train and promote able people. For years we’ve been talking about the need for younger cadres in the army and about promoting outstanding young cadres faster. But we have to admit that our work in this respect has been far from ideal. If the problem isn’t solved, we will have failed in our duty. Is there anyone sitting here who’s under 60? I doubt it. Each year that we put this off, the heavier our responsibility becomes. If this goes on for another five years, what then? Promoting younger cadres must be a key aim of our structural reform, whether in the army, in civilian organizations, in the Party or the government. We should choose a number of politically sound and relatively young cadres and promote them step by step. It’s not easy to identify able persons. Our old comrades generally can’t see beyond their own age group. Whenever we talk about promoting cadres, they select them from within their own circle. When it comes to the army, it’s even difficult for comrades of the “1938 vintage” to get promoted. The old tradition of seniority is also a problem in the army. A large group of old Red Army men, including me, are sitting at the top. This problem must be resolved. Comrade Nie Rongzhen has said that we must go forward on a solid footing. I agree. He has made a good suggestion: that we combine the efforts of the old with those of the young, because it wouldn’t work for the old just to drop everything suddenly. They should combine their efforts with those of the young and middle-aged. In the army as a whole, cadres at and under the regimental level are relatively young, while those at and above the divisional level are rather old. The working conference of the Military Commission has prepared for your comments a draft document, “Regulations Concerning the Military Service of Army Officers”. Please discuss it carefully. We must have such a document. It’s absolutely essential.

There are capable people around, but it’s hard for us to identify them, not only because of our conventional ways of thinking, but because we have too little contact with comrades at the lower levels. The year before last, when I visited the No. 2 Motor Works with Comrade Chen Pixian, one of the deputy directors showed us around. I was very impressed with him. He was one of the principal technicians in this big factory and was really on top of his job. He was then 38 years old, now he’s 40. More important, during the “cultural revolution” he was attacked for his opposition to beating, smashing and looting. And his conduct has always been good since, including his attitude towards the movement to “counter the Right deviationist trend to reverse correct verdicts”. Such people are really valuable. There are plenty of them and it’s easy to see their worth. In choosing persons for promotion, political qualifications should come first. This is a problem in the army. Comrade Yang Shangkun has said that the thinking and political viewpoints of some regimental, battalion and company cadres are not good. We should be aware of this. We should also be able to identify the better cadres. I have suggested that leading comrades in the Military Commission and the general departments — and here I include you “big mandarins” from the various regions — each draw up a list of a dozen persons. There are more than 60 comrades sitting here, so you should be able to come up with nearly a thousand names. As for political qualifications, we must exclude people of the following three types: those who rose to prominence by following Lin Biao, Jiang Qing and their like in “rebellion”; those who are seriously factionalist in their thinking; and those who engaged in beating, smashing and looting. It should be said that the great majority of those who were the so-called bystanders during the “cultural revolution” are good people; they should be trained and promoted step by step — but more quickly.

To sum up, besides combating bureaucratism and overcoming organizational bloatedness, overstaffing and inefficiency in the course of structural reform, it is important to select competent persons and promote good younger cadres to leading posts sooner so that they will be able to take over. This matter should be constantly on our agenda. We have talked about it for years, and everybody considers it a major task. It’s difficult to accomplish. But if this matter of promoting capable people isn’t settled, we won’t be able to hand over the reins, and history will count that against us. We have been slow in doing many things. We can’t afford further delays. These are my views on structural reform.

CHINA’S HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE IN ECONOMIC

CONSTRUCTION

May 6, 1982

China has not given much help to its third-world friends. That is because our country, although vast in territory, is very poor and still faces many difficulties. Since the founding of our People’s Republic [in 1949], we have essentially solved the problems of food and clothing and have become self-sufficient in grain. That in itself is quite remarkable, because these problems remained unsolved for so long in old China. In industry, we have laid a comparatively sound foundation, and although we are still very backward in this regard, the present industrial base is much better than before. We are now devoting all our efforts to construction and the rather rapid development of our economy. When we have succeeded, we shall be able to do more for our friends in the third world. Our per-capita GNP is now only US$250-260. Yours isn’t high either, but our country has a great many more people, so if we are to increase the GNP by 100 dollars per capita, that means an additional 100 billion dollars. A large population brings its own difficulties and many problems that aren’t easy to solve. A small country has some special advantages, as does a small population. Since your country is small in population and rich in natural resources, your affairs are easier to handle than ours.

Our country is now implementing an economic policy of opening to the outside world and using funds and advanced technology from abroad to help our economic development. This policy has already shown some positive results. However, it isn’t easy to get funds and advanced technology from the developed countries. There are still some people around who are wedded to the ideas of the old-line colonialists; they are reluctant to see the poor countries develop, and attempt to throttle them. Therefore, while pursuing the policy of opening to the outside world, we must stick to the principle of relying mainly on our own efforts, a principle consistently advocated by Chairman Mao Zedong since the founding of our People’s Republic. We must seek outside help on the basis of self-reliance, depending mainly on our own hard work.

You would like to know about China’s experience. The most important thing we have learned is to rely mainly on our own efforts. We have done many things on our own. The Soviet Union under Stalin gave us some assistance. But it began to take a hostile attitude towards us when Khrushchev came to power. It not only stopped helping us but stationed a million troops along the Sino-Soviet border to threaten us. The United States also was hostile to us for a long time until 1972, after which things changed somewhat. From the mid-50s to the 70s — that is, for more than 20 of the 32 years since the founding of our People’s Republic — we had no outside help, or virtually none, and had to rely mainly on our own efforts. Having no outside help also had its positive side, because we were forced to exert ourselves. In the spirit of self-reliance we managed to make atomic bombs, hydrogen bombs and missiles and to launch man-made satellites. Thus the primary thing that we’ve learned from our experience and that we would like to propose to our third-world friends is self-reliance. Of course, that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t seek outside help, but the main thing is to rely on our own efforts. Through self-reliance we can unite the people, inspire the whole country to work hard for prosperity, and thus make it easier to overcome the many difficulties in the way.

Another thing we have learned from experience is the importance of developing agriculture. As long as the people are well fed, everything else is easy, no matter what may happen in the world.

Industrial undertakings should not be on too large a scale. It is better to build medium- and small-sized projects. Conditions in your country are different from ours. With its vast territory and huge population, our country can’t get along without some large key industries. But our experience shows that one shouldn’t try to move ahead too fast or too rashly. We used to be in too much of a hurry, and we made some mistakes — “Left” mistakes, as we call them. That is to say, we made some decisions that, contrary to our expectations, resulted in a slowing down of economic growth. In our current economic development, we intend to continue to rely mainly on our own efforts and to act according to our true capability. We are working out our Sixth Five-Year Plan [1981-85] and have some tentative ideas regarding the Seventh [1986-90]. China’s economic growth will not be very rapid in the next decade because we have to tackle many problems left over from the past, including the imbalances between the different branches of the economy. For the next five or ten years, our rate of growth can probably average only 4 per cent annually; 5 per cent would be wonderful. We hope to have a higher rate of economic growth in the following 10 years, the last decade of this century.

This is just a brief summary of China’s experience in economic construction during the last three decades.

(Remarks at a meeting with the Liberian Head of State, Samuel Kanyon Doe.)

COMBAT ECONOMIC CRIME

April 10, 1982

In my opinion, this is an important document. Although it deals with the struggle against criminal activities in the economic sphere, it should in fact be regarded as of greater significance.

What is the current situation? A number of cadres have been corrupted in the brief year or two since we adopted the policy of opening to the outside world and stimulating the economy. Quite a few are involved in economic crimes. Their misdeeds are more serious than the crimes exposed in the days of the movements against the “three evils” and the “five evils”. At that time, people who had embezzled 1,000 yuan or more were rated “small tigers” and those who had embezzled 10,000 or more, “big tigers”. Today, we have many cases of very big tigers. According to press reports, an offender who had embezzled 6,000 yuan was given lenient treatment, and another who had embezzled 50,000-60,000 yuan was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment. There are many appalling cases of embezzlement or other damage to the national interest running to sums far in excess of 10,000 yuan. Some involve individuals, some involve groups. According to data supplied by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, large amounts of silver and gold were smuggled into Hong Kong in the last couple of years, causing the country heavy losses in foreign exchange. A lot of money has gone to line the pockets of certain individuals and groups. The sum would be even larger if we counted theft of public property and the like. We must not underestimate the gravity of all this. It is an ill wind and a strong one. Indeed, unless we take it seriously and firmly stop it, the question of whether our Party will change its nature may arise. This is not just alarmist talk.

We should enhance our understanding of the struggle against economic crime. At present, we have not reached a consensus on this matter. Some comrades are soft and hesitate to take action against offenders. Why? Ideologically, because they have not realized the gravity of the problem and treat it as an ordinary one. It’s not as though the problem hadn’t been raised before. We have been talking about it for a couple of years at the very least, and yet some comrades are still irresolute. Now we must not only issue the document but take determined action. Within these two months, each province should deal with some major cases. This is a different struggle from that against the Right deviation [in 1959], when it was easy to become confused and make mistakes because it was often difficult to distinguish Right deviations from “Left” ones. The theft of state property, embezzlement and bribe-taking all involve materials and money. This is very clear and it shouldn’t be hard to avoid mistakes. If we want to break the force of this ill wind, we’re going to have to take prompt, strict and stern measures. At present we think that we should not be too severe. But the ultimate penalty must be meted out in accordance with the law to some persons whose crimes are particularly grave. I assure you that it is impossible to stop this ill wind without a show of strength. We must get a firm grip on this problem now and deal with it in earnest. All cases must be handled promptly and in general severely. We cannot afford to take them lightly and be too lenient.

Another thing: Although we have said that we will not launch a movement against economic crime, we must make it clear that this is going to be a constant and protracted struggle. In my opinion, it will last at least until the day the four modernizations are achieved. If that means the end of the century, the struggle will have to be waged daily for 18 years. I think the process of socialist modernization will be accompanied by toil and struggle in four areas. These four areas, which may be called the four essential guarantees of our keeping to the socialist road, are: first, introducing structural reform; second, building a socialist civilization with a high cultural and ideological level; third, combating economic crime; and fourth, rectifying the Party’s style of work and consolidating its organization, including upholding and improving leadership by the Party. The first three tasks have been placed on our agenda, but not as yet the fourth. Of course, the first three also have to do with the question of the Party’s style of work. One way of consolidating the Party is to expel those members who are guilty of serious misdeeds and to discharge them from public employment. Embezzlers of very large sums must be expelled from the Party, no matter how much leniency is shown them because they have confessed their crimes; and if they are in military service, they must be expelled from the army. We cannot be so lenient as to allow them to remain in the Party or the army, much less be promoted. There is no way to justify that degree of leniency. They should be expelled from the Party, from the army and from public employment. The struggle against economic crime is one way of ensuring that we keep to the socialist road and realize the four modernizations. It is an ongoing struggle, a regular item of work. If we don’t make it so, how can we talk about keeping to the socialist road? Without this struggle, the four modernizations and the policy of opening to the outside world and stimulating the economy will end in failure. So we must employ dual tactics. That is, we must unswervingly pursue the policy of opening to the outside world and stimulating the economy and, at the same time, wage a resolute struggle against economic crime. There is no question that without such a struggle the overall policy will fail. With it, the policy of opening to the outside world and stimulating the economy will have a correct orientation. Of course, other problems may arise and we may also make other mistakes, but they will not be very serious. The struggle against economic crime is just beginning, and it is not a task for this year alone. It should start with a show of strength so that at least some people, including those who give themselves up, can be turned back from the wrong path. If instead of starting with such a show of determination we hesitate and delay, many more people may go astray, including some veteran cadres.

Let me say a few words in passing about Party consolidation. We must pay particular attention to the recent event in Feixiang County. I would ask the Secretariat of the Central Committee to discuss it carefully and use it as a typical example of the kind of problems to be dealt with in the campaign to consolidate the Party. The present leading body of the county Party committee should be dissolved and a new one set up. Many other localities should pay attention to such matters.

(Speech at a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC, which discussed the document, “Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council on Combating Serious Economic Crime”.)

STREAMLINING ORGANIZATIONS CONSTITUTES

A REVOLUTION

January 13, 1982

I’ll make a few points.

First, streamlining organizations is a matter of great importance. In fact it constitutes a revolution. If we fail to carry out this revolution, if we let the present overstaffed and overlapping Party and state organizations stay as they are — without clearly defined duties and with many incompetent, irresponsible, lethargic, under-educated and inefficient staff members — we ourselves will not feel satisfied and we will not have the support of the lower cadres, much less of the people. This situation cannot continue. It has become unbearable and will not be tolerated by the people or the Party. How can we permit its continuation if we want to keep to the socialist road and go on working for the four modernizations? All our veteran comrades should understand that the promotion of cadres who are more revolutionary, younger, better educated and more competent professionally is a strategic need for the revolution and construction. For us old cadres it is a most honourable and sacred obligation. It will be our last historical contribution to the Party and will put the Party spirit of each one of us to a severe test. So this matter must be resolved. It should have been resolved earlier, but unfortunately conditions have not been favourable. Today, having smashed the Gang of Four and held the Third through the Sixth Plenary Sessions of the Eleventh Central Committee, we have created such conditions. It is high time this matter was placed on our agenda. Can we afford to put it off a little longer? The longer we wait the harder it will be, because the problem will become worse, difficulties will multiply and every year more people will be involved. Besides, this is something that concerns many old comrades. Many politically conscious old comrades are still with us; they can set a good example and clear away obstacles. Here too we have a favourable condition. If we can reach a consensus of opinion, we can solve the problem more easily. There must be no further delay. In short, streamlining organizations constitutes a revolution. Of course, it is not our intention to overthrow anyone but to transform the organizational structure of our Party and state. If we don’t carry out this revolution but let the old and ailing stand in the way of young people who are energetic and able, not only will the four modernizations fail but the Party and state will face a mortal trial and perhaps perish. No matter how correct all the other policies and principles of the Party and government and no matter how great our achievements, without this revolution the Party and government organizations will continue to lack vigour and efficiency, and they will be unable to implement our policies and principles fully and to score greater successes. How will the people be able to excuse us in that case? How can we ourselves have any peace of mind? We can’t just dwell on our past achievements. We have to see the many problems surfacing every day.

My second point is that this problem concerns several million people. We are going to reduce our personnel not just by one million but by several. At the central level, we want to cut staff by one-third. At the lower levels, I think more than one-third should be trimmed. If we were to cut only one-fourth, that would still be five million people. Of course, they are not all cadres. Some will be ordinary working personnel including service workers. Each department or unit should determine its appropriate size and structure. Some persons should stay at their posts while others are taken out in rotation for training. After passing examinations, these trainees will return to their work and another group will go to be trained. Generally speaking, this plan will affect several million cadres at the higher, middle and lower levels. If we include enterprises and institutions that are also to be streamlined, even more people will be involved. In Party, government and mass organizations alone they will number four to five million. This is a big problem calling for a careful approach. But determination is of the first importance; meticulousness comes second. No matter how meticulous we are, we are bound to overlook something. That’s inevitable. I must say this beforehand. Time is pressing because we plan to finish this revolution in two years, so strong will is required. Once the Political Bureau has approved the plans, we must stand firm and brook no interference. Some foreigners are saying we will fail. Our cadres at lower levels likewise feel it will be very hard. Let me repeat: Difficulties there will be, but if we make up our minds and stand firm, I don’t believe we will fail. Don’t we always have to be confident of final victory? In my view, we must proceed with complete confidence. There is no alternative. We can’t waver. We can’t compromise. We can’t give up halfway. We can expect some trouble, including demonstrations. But don’t just agree in principle and then hesitate when personal interests are involved. Don’t be afraid of the possibility of marches and demonstrations and of the appearance of big-character posters in the process of our organizational streamlining. This process will inevitably affect a number of persons who belong to one faction or another, triggering their factionalism and causing complications. But come what may, we must stick to our guns in this revolution, standing staunch and unshakable. A little trouble is nothing to worry about; it can’t frighten us.

Thirdly, I suggest that the Political Bureau approve in principle the streamlining programme for the central state organs. But the programme for Party organs directly under the Central Committee isn’t concrete enough. Perhaps the cuts are still too small. Let me be blunt: there may not be enough revolutionary spirit in the programme. I don’t mean that we should dismantle the “big temple” of the organs directly under the Central Committee, but there are too many “small temples”. What’s more, there are too many deities in each. So there’s a lot to be done. Don’t think there isn’t much to deal with. Take the mass organizations for example. The trade union, youth and women’s organizations can take this opportunity to draw up plans for trimming their staffs and establishing compact, efficient structures, setting a good example. They used to have small staffs and organizational structures, but now they are quite big. Institutions which are not enterprises can also be streamlined. If the organizations under the State Council can reduce their staffs by a little more than 30 per cent, I’m afraid it won’t do for the central Party and mass organizations to trim by only a few per cent. We can also approve in principle the programme for organs directly under the Central Committee, then investigate further. Don’t think there is no more room for improvement. Taken as a whole, this programme is not revolutionary enough.

Although the army is just beginning to consider this problem, we are determined to reduce its size.

Once the streamlining programmes have been approved, they can get under way. First we can study the organizational structure and size of one or two departments. Take the State Council for instance. How many Vice-Premiers are needed? Some comrades at this meeting have proposed two. We may think in terms of two, but that may not be enough. Of course if two will do, I will approve. We can also have a few State Councillors. Their rank is equivalent to that of a Vice-Premier and as such they can pay state visits. But the State Councillors can be flexible in their functions, and the Premier can assign them a variety of tasks. With State Councillors we might be able to do with fewer Vice-Premiers. Please discuss this. Ministries and commissions can start trimming now. We’d better begin with one or two so as to gain experience and see the reactions and problems. Everybody will see what happens, and the other ministries and commissions will be more confident and do better. In brief, we’ll spend half a year on streamlining at the central level. That should be enough to get things into shape. How we deal with the persons who are no longer needed is another problem. It will take longer to complete that job. But so far as organizational structure is concerned, there should be preliminary results within six months. I think that’s enough time to work out the size and structure of each ministry and commission. If it’s really insufficient, we can take nine months, but no more. Of course, the provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions can start carrying out their programmes after the central organizations have been doing so for a period. They don’t have to wait until the central organs have finished. After programmes have been decided on and a few pilot units have gained experience, the local organizations can start their paring down. At the central level, we can take one or two units — The Ministry of Foreign Trade, for instance — to test our plan in practice. Again, couldn’t we combine the Ministry of Water Conservancy and the Ministry of Electric Power? It shouldn’t be hard to merge them. We’ll watch to see what problems arise. There may be different reactions and questions raised from various angles. The streamlining programmes can’t be perfect right away. If they are all right on the whole, that will do. We must be strict on matters of principle because it is only too easy to go soft. This time we must be strict and not ease up. For example, after we fix the quota for vice-ministers — that there will be so many and no more — although the incumbents may change in the future, the number cannot. This will facilitate replacements. Otherwise, there will be too many leaders. We’ll arrange things so that it won’t be easy to add even a single person. Thus the way can be paved for younger cadres to come up. With the number of personnel fixed, everyone will really have to do his job; there will be no room for nominal or semi-nominal posts. Some comrades say they are still up to their jobs, but if full responsibility really fell on them, could they handle it? They will have to take the test. If you were to ask me to work eight hours a day at my age, I’m sure I couldn’t do it.

To sum up, we may approve these two programmes in principle today, and then we should move to implement them. We are going to spend a month or two trying them out in a couple of units, deciding on their structure and size, defining the duties of each unit and each person, assigning specific jobs to individuals and watching for problems.

My fourth and last point is that in this revolution we must pay attention not only to cutting back staff but also to promoting people. I have just said that we have to cut staff by several million and that this matter must be handled well. But promotion is the primary issue. Selecting and promoting the right people to the leadership of ministries and their departments and bureaus is the most important thing. This is also true for the army. Promotion is primary, cutbacks are secondary. We must make the best choices, “selecting the virtuous and appointing the able”, as the saying goes. This embraces the three qualifications of political quality, competence and experience. “Virtuous” means of good political quality, while “able” means having professional knowledge, a good education, practical experience and a physical constitution up to the demands of the job. This time we are asking supernumerary and ailing old comrades to retire or to transfer to more suitable positions (I mean honorary positions). Who will replace them? The best candidates must be found. As I’ve said before, we must stick to the points Comrade Chen Yun discussed. There are a few types of persons who can never be considered. We have plenty of people. In promotions, the key is to select younger people. Of course, there will probably be a transition period: For a year or two, especially right after the streamlining, elderly comrades will continue to serve as ministers. The reason is easy to understand. When the size of the State Council is reduced, the ministries and commissions will have more power and will in turn allow enterprises and institutions under them to have more authority. This too is part of setting things right. We should do our best to choose younger persons as vice-ministers and department and bureau chiefs. When we founded the People’s Republic, all our ministers were young, almost all of them in their thirties or forties. Many persons who are now our mainstays in different professions graduated from universities in the fifties and sixties and have much more knowledge than our former ministers had. Streamlining is a revolution. So is “selecting the virtuous and appointing the able”. We must do a good job of organizational trimming and — even more important — we must do a good job of promoting cadres. We must complete both these tasks at the same time and not leave them for some future campaign. The present streamlining can be seen as a small-scale campaign. We have said we will not launch any big campaigns. But this is just a small one and the methods are completely different from any we have used in the past.

That’s all I want to say on my four points.

(Remarks at a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party concerning the streamlining of the central organizations.)

BUILD POWERFUL, MODERN AND REGULARIZED

REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES

September 19, 1981

Comrade officers and men,

You have successfully performed your task in these military exercises. On behalf of the Central Committee of the Party, the State Council, and the Military Commission of the Central Committee, I want to express our warm greetings and congratulations.

These exercises have given us an opportunity to assess our achievements in building modern, regularized armed forces, and have simulated modern warfare fairly well. They represent part of our effort to explore combined operations by the various services and arms under modern conditions, and have enhanced the political consciousness and military capability of our army, especially its capacity to fight actual battles. This will give a great impetus to our efforts to build up the armed forces, train them and make them ready in the event of war. The exercises have achieved the anticipated results and have been a success. They have fully demonstrated that our people’s forces, created by the Party and armed with Mao Zedong Thought, are politically and militarily sound, that they possess a fine style of combat and a strict sense of organization and discipline, and that they are combat-worthy. We are convinced that with such a fine army and with the support of the masses, we can defeat any aggressor.

At present our country is passing through a significant period in its history as we strive to carry forward the revolutionary cause and open up new vistas for it. Thanks to the vigorous implementation of the Party’s correct line, principles and policies, political stability and unity have been enhanced throughout the Party and army and among our people of all nationalities, and the situation in all fields is steadily improving. On the international scene, the struggle against hegemonism has grown and the hegemonists are increasingly isolated. But we must recognize that the intensified rivalry between the superpowers and the quickened pace of global strategic deployment by the Soviet hegemonists present a serious threat to world peace and to our own national security. We must be constantly alert to this danger.

As a strong pillar of our people’s democratic dictatorship, the army is entrusted with the glorious mission of defending our socialist motherland and China’s four modernizations. We must therefore make it a powerful, modern and regularized revolutionary army.

We must adhere to the Four Cardinal Principles, strengthen political and ideological work, and try to make the armed forces a model so far as carrying out the Party’s line, principles and policies is concerned.

On the basis of our steadily expanding economy, we must improve the army’s weapons and equipment and speed up the modernization of our national defence.

We must further cement the army’s relations with the civil authorities and the people, enhance unity inside the army, improve our work in building the people’s militia and carry forward the glorious traditions of an army of the people.

We must intensify the army’s military and political training and further enhance its political consciousness and military capability. We must work hard to improve its ability to conduct combined operations involving the various services and arms under modern conditions.

We must be modest and prudent, guard against arrogance and rashness and further promote the “four haves, three stresses and two defy’s”. We must make greater efforts to cultivate a fine style of work and to foster a strict sense of organization and discipline in the armed forces.

We must make solid preparations to resist wars of aggression, make new contributions to the safeguarding of world peace and the territorial integrity of our country, and work for the early return of Taiwan to the motherland so as to achieve the sacred goal of national reunification.

(Speech on reviewing the People’s Liberation Army units taking part in military exercises in north China. Comrade Deng Xiaoping was elected Chairman of the Military Commission of the Central Committee at the Sixth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in June 1981.)

CONCERNING PROBLEMS

ON THE IDEOLOGICAL FRONT

July 17, 1981

A short time ago I told Comrade Hu Yaobang that I wanted to talk with the propaganda departments about problems on the ideological front, especially those in literature and art. The Party’s leadership on this front — including literature and art — has achieved noteworthy success. This should be affirmed. But certain tendencies towards a crude approach and over-simplification cannot be ignored or denied. However, a more important problem at present, I think, is laxity and weakness and a fear of criticizing wrong trends. As soon as you criticize something, you are accused of brandishing a big stick. It is very hard nowadays for us to carry out criticism, let alone self-criticism. Self-criticism is one of the three major features of our Party’s style of work, one of the chief characteristics distinguishing our Party from other political parties. For quite a number of our people, however, it now seems difficult to practise.

Prior to the Sixth Plenary Session of the Central Committee [late June 1981], the General Political Department of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army raised the question of criticizing the film script Unrequited Love. I have been taken aback by some other things I’ve read recently too. A young poet made an irresponsible speech at Beijing Normal University. Some students commented that although the Party organization had done a lot of ideological and political work among the students, that speech blew it all away. The university Party committee was aware of this matter but took no measures. It was a woman student who wrote a letter to the Party committee criticizing our weak ideological work. Recently in Urumqi, Xinjiang, a person in charge of the preparatory group for the formation of the local federation of writers and artists talked a lot of nonsense. Many of his views went far beyond certain wrong, anti-socialist statements criticized during the anti-Rightist struggle of 1957. There are many other examples. To put it in a nutshell, these people want to abandon the road of socialism, break away from Party leadership and promote bourgeois liberalization. Let us recall the 1957 experience. It was incorrect then to broaden the scope of the anti-Rightist struggle, but it was necessary to oppose the Rightists. You will certainly all remember how aggressive some Rightists were. So are some people today. We are not going to launch an anti-Rightist campaign again. But on no account should we give up serious criticism of erroneous trends. This type of problem has arisen not only in literary and art circles but elsewhere as well. Some persons are not on the right track ideologically. They make statements contrary to Party principles and are neither honest nor upright. Yet there are other people who admire them and eagerly publish their articles. This is quite wrong. Some Party members don’t act in accordance with Party spirit but persist in factionalism. They must not be allowed to influence others, let alone to become leaders. Some persons now fancy themselves as heroes. Before they were criticized, they didn’t attract much attention. But once they were criticized, they began to be sought after. This is an abnormal phenom”ienon and we must work seriously to eradicate it. Its social and historical background can be traced mainly to the 10-year turmoil of the “cultural revolution”; it is also connected with corrosion by bourgeois ideology from abroad. We must analyse each case concretely. At present, the main problem is not so much the existence of this phenomenon as the fact that we are too soft in handling it. There is laxity and weakness. Of course, in solving current problems, we should learn from past experience and refrain from launching a movement. We must analyse each case on its merits and treat each person who has made errors appropriately, according to the nature and seriousness of the mistakes. Methods of criticism must be studied. Arguments must hit the nail on the head. We must not resort to converging attacks and movements. But there must be ideological work, criticism and self-criticism. We must not lay aside the weapon of criticism. After that young poet delivered his speech at Beijing Normal University, some students said that if we allowed things to go on this way, our country would be ruined. He took a position opposite to ours. I have seen the movie Sun and Man, which follows the script of Unrequited Love. Whatever the author’s motives, the movie gives the impression that the Communist Party and the socialist system are bad. It vilifies the latter to such an extent that one wonders what has happened to the author’s Party spirit. Some say the movie achieves a fairly high artistic standard, but that only makes it all the more harmful. In fact, a work of this sort has the same effect as the views of the so-called democrats.

The essence of the Four Cardinal Principles is to uphold Communist Party leadership. Without Party leadership there definitely will be nationwide disorder and China would fall apart. History has shown us this. Chiang Kai-shek was never able to unify China. The keystone of bourgeois liberalization is opposition to Party leadership. But without Party leadership there will be no socialist system. In confronting these problems, we must not take the old path and resort to political movements. We must, however, make appropriate use of the weapon of criticism.

It was right for Jiefangjun Bao (Liberation Army Daily) to criticize Unrequited Love. The criticism was necessary, which must be affirmed. But the articles were not always entirely reasonable, and some of their tactics and arguments were not carefully thought out. Wenyi Bao (Literary Gazette) should publish several articles of high quality to comment on both Unrequited Love and related problems. We can’t declare that a criticism is incorrect just because the methods used are not good enough.

Some young people are discontented with certain social conditions today. There is nothing strange about this and it is nothing to be afraid of. But we must guide such young people or they may go astray. It is good that many young writers have emerged in recent years. They have written a number of fine works. But we must admit that among them — and among some middle-aged writers too — there are also bad tendencies that have an adverse influence on some young readers, listeners and viewers. Our veteran writers who stick to the socialist position have the responsibility to unite and give proper guidance to the new generation. Otherwise, it won’t be able to advance along the right path. If we don’t do a good job in this respect, contradictions may intensify and result in major disruptions. In a word, we must uphold Party leadership and the socialist system. They must be improved, but that doesn’t mean we can have bourgeois liberalization or anarchy. Just imagine what sort of influence Sun and Man would have if shown to the public. Someone has said that not loving socialism isn’t equivalent to not loving one’s motherland. Is the motherland something abstract? If you don’t love socialist New China led by the Communist Party, what motherland do you love? We do not ask all our patriotic compatriots in Hong Kong and Macao and in Taiwan and abroad to support socialism, but at the least, they should not oppose socialist New China. Otherwise, how can they be called patriotic? Of every citizen — and every young person — living under the leadership of the government in the People’s Republic of China, however, we demand more. Above all, we demand that writers, artists and ideological and theoretical workers in the Communist Party observe Party discipline. Yet today many of our problems stem from inside the Party. If the Party can’t discipline its own members, how can it lead the masses? We insist on the policy of “letting a hundred flowers bloom, a hundred schools of thought contend”, and on handling contradictions among the people correctly. This will remain unchanged. True, the “Left” tendency still exists in the guidance of our ideological and cultural work, and we must resolutely guard against it and correct it. But that certainly doesn’t mean we should stop practising criticism and self-criticism. The main way to correctly handle contradictions among the people is to start from the desire for unity, carry out criticism and self-criticism and arrive at a new unity. The policy of “letting a hundred flowers bloom, a hundred schools of thought contend” cannot be separated from the practice of criticism and self-criticism. In criticizing, we must be democratic and reason things out, but criticism should never be dismissed offhand as using the “big stick”. We must get clear on this whole question of criticism and self-criticism, for it is important in bringing along the next generation. I have mentioned a few works and views that need to be criticized. There are other works containing similar views. There also are certain tendencies towards bourgeois liberalization among theorists, but I am not going to elaborate on them here. Why is it the Unrequited Love and the speech by the young poet have the support of some people? That is something our comrades on the ideological front should ponder.

Since we began stressing the need to uphold the Four Cardinal Principles, comrades in our ideological circles have become clearer in their thinking. Because of this and also because of the resolute steps taken to get rid of illegal organizations and publications, the situation has improved. But we must remain on the alert. Some people are raising a banner in support of Comrade Hua Guofeng, while actually trying to overthrow you know who. Watch out! This shows how complicated the present struggle is, and how necessary it is to sharpen our vigilance.

It is no longer necessary for Jiefangjun Bao to continue its criticism of Unrequited Love. Wenyi Bao should publish some first-class articles on the subject, and they should be reprinted in Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily).

To sum up, our entire Party, army and people should unite as one, march in step, and work hard to achieve further success on the ideological, literary, art and other fronts under the firm leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and on the basis of the “Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China”, adopted at the Sixth Plenary Session of the Central Committee.

(Summary of a talk with leading comrades of the central propaganda departments.)

THE PRIMARY TASK OF VETERAN CADRES IS TO

SELECT YOUNG AND MIDDLE-AGED

CADRES FOR PROMOTION

July 2, 1981

My original intention in coming today was only to listen to what our comrades had to say. But the question of selecting and training young and middle-aged cadres is extremely important, so I have decided to say a few words about it myself. We constantly stress that it is a question of strategic importance on which the very destiny of our Party depends. It has now become extremely urgent to resolve this issue. If we don’t resolve it within three to five years, we shall be faced with catastrophe. Foreigners have described our recent Sixth Plenary Session of the Central Committee as having arranged for the transfer of leadership and settled the question of top personnel without friction, and they have praised us for having dealt with these matters in an orderly way. Nevertheless, if we don’t solve the problem of succession on a nationwide scale within three to five years, chaos may ensue. Some veteran cadres are no longer with us and others are no longer able to work, while new cadres cannot be promoted, or if they are, there is always some kind of objection. Many veteran cadres think the only good cadres are those who support them, and this seems to be a widespread phenomenon in the Party. To put it bluntly, the question of whether people are appointed on their merits or by favouritism has not been settled satisfactorily. I don’t mean that this applies to all veteran comrades, but it does apply to a considerable number. I suggest we learn from Comrade Liu Lanbo, who was mentioned at this meeting today. He personally recommended a younger comrade to succeed him as Minister of Electric Power. Why have you all been asked to stay on at the end of the Sixth Plenary Session for this two-day meeting to discuss Comrade Chen Yun’s proposals for promoting and training young and middle-aged cadres and for retiring old ones? It’s because this question is very urgent, very important. Comrades from the army may recall that I brought up the question of lowering the average age of army cadres at a conference on political work convened in 1964. That was 17 or 18 years ago. Although the question was not yet very urgent then, it had already surfaced. I also said at that conference that wisdom increases with age. But that was in the early sixties, and the situation today is completely different. In short, we have become more and more aware of the urgency of the matter. Therefore, the Central Committee has recently been considering the establishment of two central commissions under the new [Twelfth] Central Committee, an advisory commission and a commission for discipline inspection, to absorb a number of veteran comrades. The members of the Central Committee would be somewhat younger, which would be good for the future. We veteran comrades should have an enlightened attitude and take the lead in solving this major problem of reducing the cadres’ average age. Otherwise, it will be impossible to solve. If the veteran comrades don’t take the lead, the others will hesitate to select younger cadres. And even if you issue orders that younger cadres are to be selected, there is no certainty that the right persons will be chosen, for some comrades will still be considering which persons support them personally. We must be cautious, because the hard-core elements of the Gang of Four and those who engaged in beating, smashing and looting during the “cultural revolution” are clever and opportunistic, and they know how to brag about themselves and flatter other people. Our veteran comrades are liable to be taken in by them. Therefore, the crux of the matter is that veterans should take the lead, really be selfless and keep the overall situation in mind.

After the Central Working Conference last December, Comrade Chen Yun put this question more sharply than before. He stated it well, and I agree with him. We had been rather timid at first, but on that occasion he suggested that it was not scores or hundreds of young and middle-aged cadres who should be selected for promotion but thousands and tens of thousands. And what he really meant was “tens of thousands” — the “thousands” was just thrown in for rhetorical effect. Some of those we select now will be removed from office when it becomes clear that they are not the right choices. For the present we may begin by selecting, say, 50,000. They should be recruited into the leading bodies after three to five, or perhaps seven to eight, years of work. That is, they will be prepared as successors to comrades now working at the provincial, municipal and ministerial levels (or at corresponding levels in large factories, mines and other enterprises), and the outstanding ones should be brought into the central organizations. Those who are now around 40 will then be 47 or 48 — not so young any more. If they are now around 50, they will be pushing 60. I am afraid that only a few comrades present here today are still young; generally speaking, all of us must be at least 60, and the great majority over 60. What about seven to eight years from now, when we are all close to 70 or even older? You can see that this is a matter we have to take very seriously.

Are the persons we need available? In my opinion, we should be able to find one or two hundred thousand. The question is whether we can make up our minds to look for them, whether we are ready to make a proper search by conducting the necessary investigations. What are the criteria? We need chiefly persons who graduated from college or university in the sixties. There should be 600,000 from the pre-“cultural revolution” years 1961-66, assuming there were 100,000 graduates a year. And if we include graduates from the vocational secondary schools, the total is nearly two million. These people are relatively well trained professionally. There are ample data to show that the great majority of the college and university graduates of those years have done pretty well. These people are now around 40. The deputy director I met in the No. 2 Motor Works graduated from college immediately before the “cultural revolution”, and he is now 39. Although some of these people behaved badly during the “cultural revolution”, most were “bystanders”. Take, for example, the comrade I have just mentioned. He disapproved of the “cultural revolution” and was attacked in its early days. Having been attacked during the “cultural revolution” is a measure of political merit. Are people like him qualified? He is now already a deputy director of a big motor works. Why could he not be given further training and sent to a Party school or assigned to some other post where he could be further tempered? People of his type are easy to find if only we keep our eyes open. In general, though, they are thought to be too inexperienced or, as people sometimes say, too “conceited”. I have my doubts about their being “conceited”. An enthusiastic and capable person is always self-confident and has ideas of his own. The more ideas you have, the more self-confident you are. There’s nothing bad about that. If the person really is a bit conceited, he will learn modesty when assigned to an appropriate post, for otherwise he will find it hard to work there. When I say we can find capable people, I mean there may be 150,000, not just 50,000. Among those with professional knowledge — apart from graduates of universities, colleges and vocational secondary schools — we have the numerous people who have educated themselves through independent study. The right people are on hand; the question is whether we select them or not. When Comrade Chen Yun spoke, one of the things he suggested was that the Organization Department under the Central Committee should establish an office to take charge of affairs relating to young and middle-aged cadres. That is an important proposal.

What is essential is that once we have decided on the task of selecting young and middle-aged cadres for promotion, we should set about doing so. The work requires a defined objective. I would like to ask you to discuss whether we should draw up a five-year plan for it. The best thing would be a four-year plan ending in 1985 [to coincide with the end for the Sixth Five-Year Plan]. But I propose that we draw up two plans on this cadre question — a five-year and a 10-year plan. In the first five years we should select, say, 50,000 people and assign them to appropriate posts where they can be tempered. We should decide what percentage of leaders at the ministerial, departmental and bureau levels and at the provincial, municipal and autonomous-region levels should be around 50 and what percentage should be around 40, and then try to reach those percentages gradually within the next five years. For the second five years, we should set age limits for leaders at certain levels (for example, the provincial, municipal and autonomous-region and ministerial levels), which will apply with only certain special exceptions. Please discuss whether these proposals are feasible. I have been talking about details. The army has drafted some guidelines that it is now trying to apply. It has suggested age limits for regimental, divisional and army-level cadres of around 30, 40 and 50, respectively. Some units have complied with these regulations quite well; others have not. In the future, systems relating to civilian cadres — the retirement system, for instance — should also have specific age regulations. Other countries have retirement systems. For example, army officers in most countries retire at the age of 60, though they can take up civilian jobs afterwards. As for civilian officials, Japanese diplomats, for example, are expected to retire at 65, while some countries set even lower retirement ages. It seems to me that we too should have some age limits. Perhaps we cannot put such limits into effect in the first five years. But couldn’t we set it as an objective for the second five-year plan? In addition to limits on cadres’ ages, there should be limits on their number in a given unit. For example, aren’t one minister and two to four vice-ministers enough for a ministry? Why do we need more than a dozen vice-ministers for each ministry when it is the departments directly subordinate to it that are in charge of professional work? Here I am talking about the need for a major reform. It is partly because of this overstaffing at the top that we have the problem of bureaucracy and so many things just don’t get done. It is enough for a ministry to have four vice-ministers at the most and for a department or bureau to have still fewer deputy heads. Why should a department or bureau have so many deputy leaders? Two at most are enough. Our grave propensity to bureaucracy is inseparable from the current overstaffing of our organizations. Of course, in the first five years there will be the question of replacing the old cadres by the young, and there will be a five- to ten-year period of transition. The central issue is whether in the first five years we can select about 50,000 cadres some of whom are just under 50, some around 40 and some even younger. And there should be a proper ratio of cadres in these different age groups. Then we can take up the question of how to rationalize our cadre system and administrative structure, a question which should be solved in a comprehensive way during the second five years. The first five years are the most important. During that period, comrades present here will have to take the responsibility. But by the second five years how many of us will still be around? How many will still be able to work as usual? It’s hard to say. Five years from now, those who are now 65 will be 70. Time flies. Therefore, I raise both hands in support of Comrade Chen Yun’s proposal. It remains to discuss the concrete measures to turn his proposal into reality. We have to be sensible in this matter. I have had a heart-to-heart talk with Comrade Chen Yun. Frankly, so far as the two of us are concerned, we would really be very happy to retire now. But of course we can’t do that yet. What is our most important job, then? Naturally we have to concern ourselves with state policies and the Party’s principles, but what is of the utmost importance is to settle the question of selecting young and middle-aged cadres for promotion. This is the principal task for the two of us. I hope that all comrades here who are more than 60 will also make settling this question their primary task. It’s too important for us to neglect. That is all I want to say today.

(Speech at a forum of secretaries of Party committees of provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions.)

CLOSING SPEECH AT THE SIXTH PLENARY SESSION

OF THE ELEVENTH CENTRAL COMMITTEE

OF THE CPC

June 29, 1981

I believe that this plenary session has settled two questions very well indeed. First, it has adopted the “Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China”, which really lives up to our original requirements. It will be immensely important in unifying thinking inside the Party. Of course, as Comrade Hu Yaobang said, it will still take another year’s work to really achieve that unity. But in any event we have a unified standard that from now on can serve as a guide to every Party member when making statements. Even if one has not yet straightened out his own thinking in this respect, in deference to organizational discipline he should take the resolution as a guide. We believe that it will stand the test of history.

The second question concerns personnel. At this session, we have elected Comrade Hu Yaobang Chairman of the Central Committee, and he has just made a brief speech that I think proves our choice was correct. And Comrade Zhao Ziyang has also been promoted to a higher position in the Party.

So, in settling these two important questions, the session has taken major policy decisions and made major choices. We believe that both decisions and choices are correct. Hence, our session is of great significance. This is clear from our communique. We have definitely accomplished our mission.

Have you anything more to say, Comrades? If not, let us declare that the Sixth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee has successfully completed its work.